This study emphasizes the importance of enhancing food safety and hygiene practices among sidewalk vendors to safeguard public health in Balayan Public Market. Employing a mixed-methods approach, with both quantitative and qualitative components, a diverse sample of 55 consumers, 5 sidewalk vendors, and 5 market administrators was selected using a combination of purposive and random sampling techniques under non-probability sampling. Microbial investigations were conducted during both the initial sampling and testing phase (A) and subsequent sampling and testing phase (B) on (...) popular street food items at Lipa Quality Control Inc., including chicken nuggets, chicken nugget sauce (sweet and vinegar), Isaw, Isaw sauce, Proben, Proben sauce, Calamares, Calamares Vinegar Sauce, Kwek- Kwek, and Kwek-Kwek sauce. The findings reveal that “Isaw and Chicken Nuggets Sauce (Sweet)” had a result of “Too Numerous To Count (TNTC),” indicating an extraordinarily high bacteria count. This underscores the imperative need to raise awareness and provide targeted guidance to sidewalk vendors regarding essential food handling, storage, and sanitation practices. Therefore, a sanitary action plan is developed to promote community engagement, educational initiatives, and regulatory support, enhancing food safety practices among sidewalk vendors and ensuring a safer and healthier food environment. (shrink)

Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.

Claudia Blöser has recently proposed that Kant’s duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral guilt, a need we have in virtue of our morally fallible nature, irrespectively of whether we have repented. I argue that Blöser's proposal does not fit well with certain central aspects of Kant’s views on moral guilt. For Kant, moral guilt is a complex phenomenon, that has both an intellectual and an affective aspect. I argue (...) that it is not even possible for us to fully overcome our intellectual guilt, and to the extent that it is possible to ameliorate our felt guilt, this is largely a matter of self-forgiveness. However, self-forgiveness is only appropriate when there is repentance for the wrongful action and rejection of its underlying immoral maxim by the wrongdoer as part of a project of moral transformation. I offer an alternative account of the human need for forgiveness, an account that makes forgiveness conditional on repentance. (shrink)

Forgiveness as a positive response to wrongdoing is a widespread phenomenon that plays a role in the moral lives of most persons. Surprisingly, Kant has very little to say on the matter. Although Kant dedicates considerable space to discussing punishment, wrongdoing and grace, he addresses the issues of human forgiveness directly only in some short passages in the Lectures on Ethics and in one passage of the Metaphysics of Morals. As noted by Sussman, the TL passage, however, betrays some ambivalence. (...) Kant establishes a duty of virtue to be forgiving (TL, 6:460), yet he immediately warns against its excess: meek toleration of recurrent wrongs could manifest a lack of self-respect and a violation of a duty to oneself (TL, 6:461). Sussman claims that this ambivalence ultimately arises from the fact that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought. First, forgiveness has an ‘ineluctably elective aspect’ that makes it, to a certain extent, arbitrary and dependent on particular features of the forgiver’s psychology and, as such, in tension with Kant’s central claims that human beings are autonomous agents capable of determining their own moral status. Second, according to Sussman, Kant’s moral retributivism, i.e. ‘the particular moral position that every moral wrong against another deserves punishment of the wrongdoer’ seems to be in tension with the possibility of a ‘truly redemptive forgiveness’. Moreover, forgiveness also seems to be in tension with a passage of the Religion in which Kant argues that the moral guilt from our original evil disposition cannot be understood as a debt or liability that can be compensated, erased, transferred or otherwise wiped out by others (Rel, 6:72). Thus, to the extent that forgiveness might be thought to involve the forgoing of moral guilt, it seems incompatible with Kant’s views on culpability and punishment. This chapter seeks to clarify Kant’s views on forgiveness in order to show that, although not often appreciated, personal forgiveness plays an important role in the lives of ordinary human agents as understood by Kant. In particular, I aim to show there is a conception of forgiveness available to Kant that is not incompatible with Kant’s views of punishment and culpability. In Section 1, I argue that, for Kant, far from being merely ‘elective,’ forgiveness is, under certain conditions, morally required. I provide a brief summary of an interpretation of Kant’s theory of forgiveness that I have defended in recently published work , in order to argue that Kant’s duty to be forgiving should be understood as an imperfect duty of virtue which is conditional on repentance. Kant is not ambivalent about this duty because he maintains that when the relevant conditions are not met, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. The TL passage thus identifies two different duties. In Section 2, I show that forgiveness, as conceptualised by Kant, does not require the forgoing of punishment or the overcoming of moral guilt and that this could, in fact, be seen as an attractive feature of Kant’s position. I end by offering a very brief assessment of Kant’s views. (shrink)

Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining (...) their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings. (shrink)

In ‘Human Fallibility and the Need for Forgiveness’, Claudia Blöser has proposed a Kantian account of our reasons to forgive that situates our moral fallibility as their ultimate ground. Blöser argues that Kant’s duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral failure, a need that we all have in virtue of our moral fallible nature, regardless of whether or not we have repented. Blöser claims that Kant’s proposal yields a plausible (...) account of the normative status of forgiveness. Kant classifies the duty to be forgiving as a wide duty of virtue, and according to Blöser, this means that Kantian forgiveness is elective in the sense that forgiveness is good in general but without being obligatory in each particular case. In the course of presenting her own reconstruction of Kant’s account, Blöser also objects to some aspects of an interpretation of Kant’s theory of forgiveness which I had previously defended in my paper ‘Forgiveness and Moral Development’. Although there are a lot of points of agreement between our interpretations, the aim of this article is to highlight four key points of disagreement. These issues are worth discussing because they have implications not only for a plausible interpretation of a recognisable Kantian account of forgiveness but also for wider debates in the contemporary literature on forgiveness. First, I show that Kant is not committed to a form of weak situationism as suggested by Blöser and that Kant’s grounding of the duty to be forgiving does not appeal to moral luck. Second, I argue that although Kant’s duty to be forgiving is elective in one sense of the term, it is not elective in another important sense of the term, and that it is in fact better not to interpret Kantian imperfect duties as being elective. Third, I show that awareness of moral fallibility per se does not provide a morally appropriate ground for forgiveness and offer an alternative reconstruction of Kant’s account- in which fallibility plays a role, but it is not the main reason to forgive. Finally, I argue that Blöser’s account of the need to be forgiven is not recognisable Kantian because, from a Kantian perspective, repentance is a necessary condition for the desirability and, in fact, the very possibility of ameliorating our own guilt. (shrink)

Kant famously made a distinction between actions from duty and actions in conformity with duty claiming that only the former are morally worthy. Kant’s argument in support of this thesis is taken to rest on the claim that only the motive of duty leads non-accidentally or reliably to moral actions. However, many critics of Kant have claimed that other motives such as sympathy and benevolence can also lead to moral actions reliably, and that Kant’s thesis is false. In addition, many (...) readers of Kant find the claim that we should deny moral worth to a dutiful action performed from friendly inclination highly counterintuitive. Moreover, Kantian commentators disagree about the status of actions in conformity with duty, some claim that these can be taken as equally morally worthy as those performed from duty, while others argue that they are not even permissible. -/- It has also been claimed that Kant’s theory of moral worth should be related to the theory of the Gesinnung developed in the Religion. Thus, some authors claim that, in order for an action to possess moral worth, the agent has to be unconditionally committed to morality, that is, the agent must possess a virtuous character or good fundamental maxim (i.e. a good Gesinnung). However, according to Kant’s radical evil thesis (that is, the thesis that man is evil by nature ), the default position for man is to possess an evil Gesinnung, i.e. a Gesinnung which is only conditionally committed to morality insofar as morality does not demand a great sacrifice of our own happiness. So, an unwelcome consequence of this line of interpretation is that in Kantian ethics morally worthy actions become very rare indeed. -/- The paper is divided in two parts. The first part aims to clarify why Kant thought that only actions from duty are morally worthy, replying to some common objections against Kant’s view. I argue that Kant’s non-accidental condition should not be understood in terms of reliability because such interpretation is incompatible with Kant’s theory of motivation and rational agency. I propose an alternative interpretation which supports Kant’ s claim that only the motive of duty leads nonaccidently to dutiful actions, and thus only actions from duty possess moral worth. I end by showing that although actions in conformity with duty are worthless from the moral point of view, they are not (in many cases) impermissible. The first part concludes that the criterion for the permissibility of actions is different to the criterion for the ascription of moral worth. Thus, rightness, which pertains to actions performed on maxims that can be willed as universal laws, and moral worth, which pertains to actions performed from a sense of duty, should be understood as two different levels of moral assessment. -/- The second part of the paper examines Kant’s conception of virtue with the aim of showing that although only agents with a virtuous character (good Gesinnung) will reliably act from duty, a person with an evil character (evil Gesinnung) could on frequent occasions act from duty. I argue that we should not deny moral worth to actions performed from duty even when the agent has an evil Gesinnung. Goodness of Gesinnung is not a necessary condition of the action of an agent possessing moral worth; reliability of motivation is necessary for the ascription of virtue but not for the ascription of moral worth. It follows that virtue, which refers to the agent’s character or fundamental maxim (i.e. the agent’s Gesinnung), and moral worth are also two different levels of moral assessment. The paper concludes that three levels of moral assessment can be distinguished in Kant’s ethical system: (i) rightness, (ii) moral worth and (iii) moral virtue. Moral virtue is the highest level of moral perfection for a human being. Striving towards virtue requires constant progress and effort and ultimately a ‘revolution of the heart.’ The important point is that even when we are still striving to achieve virtue (i.e. an unconditional commitment to morality), we can ascribe moral worth to actions performed by a genuine sense of duty. It turns out that, contrary to many influential interpretations, Kantian ethics is not merely concerned with the rightness or wrongness of particular actions nor is Kantian ethics primarily an ethic of virtue. Instead, Kant’s ethical system is complex and allows for different levels of moral assessment in which both an action-centred and agent-centred perspective can be integrated. (shrink)

Images abound of women throughout the ages engaging in various activities. But why are there so few representations of childbirth in visual art? Feminist artist Judy Chicago once suggested that depictions of women giving birth do not commonly occur in Western culture but can be found in other contexts such as pre-Columbian art or societies previously considered "primitive." Chicago's own exploration of the theme resulted in the creation of The Birth Project (1980-85): an unprecedented series of eighty handcrafted works of (...) art created in a variety of needlework techniques by more than 130 artisans that celebrate the experience of birth and a woman's transformation into motherhood. But why is The Birth Project an aberration from today's norm? What are the reasons that childbirth remains a taboo subject in our visual culture? Why is the birthing experience--so pervasive for women--so infrequently celebrated, even by female artists? (shrink)

I argue that political forgiveness is sometimes, but not always, compatible with public commemoration of politically motivated wrongdoing. I start by endorsing the claim that commemorating serious past wrongdoing has moral value and imposes moral demands on key actors within post-conflict societies. I am concerned with active commemoration, that is, the deliberate acts of bringing victims and the wrong done to them to public attention. The main issue is whether political forgiveness requires forgetting and conversely whether remembrance can be an (...) impediment to political forgiveness. The notion of political forgiveness, its definition, very possibility and desirability are contentious issues in the contemporary literature. I develop a multidimensional account of political forgiveness with a core element. The core element of political forgiveness involves taking a non-adversarial stance towards perpetrators in the sense of committing to stop holding their wrongdoing against them. The core element of forgiveness is usually combined with other attitudes and practices, which are appropriate depending on the circumstances. This is due to the fact that there are different ways of holding a wrong against an offender. I argue that forgiving perpetrators is not compatible with continue to punishing them, refusing to reconcile with them, and/or reminding them of their misdeed if perpetrators refuse to accept punishment, deny the importance of commemorating the past or wish to reconcile against the victim’s desires. I show that some forms of political forgiveness are not morally legitimate because they conflict with moral demands to punish perpetrators, commemorate atrocities and respect victims. This conclusion is less alarming than it might initially seem because the refusal to forgive politically motivated wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to the perpetuation of violence and conflict. I briefly draw on the example of Argentina in order to show how some forms of political un-forgiveness can be morally legitimate and effective ways for victims to uphold these demands. (shrink)

In this article, I address the issue of whether we have an obligation to remember past immoral actions. My central question is: do we have an obligation to remember past moral transgressions? I address this central question through three more specific questions. In the first section, I enquiry whether we have an obligation to remember our own past transgressions. In the second section, I ask whether we have an obligation to remember the wrongful actions that others have committed against ourselves. (...) In the last section, I investigate whether we have a duty to remember the suffering of victims of crimes that have a political aspect, crimes such as state violence, oppression and racial discrimination, for example. Here I use the term ‘obligation’ in a board sense to refer to actions that are recommended from the moral point of view, that is, when we have moral reasons to act in a certain way. Here I decided to explore these issues from a Kantian perspective. At first glance, Kant does not seem to have much to offer to an ethics of memory since he does not ask these questions directly. Nevertheless, I was interested to explore to what extent Kant’s ethics, and Kantian ethics more generally, can give us tools to answer these questions. What I have discovered is that, despite my initial doubts, the Kantian framework can provide us with materials to build arguments that can help us to answer these questions. In fact, I will argue that in Kant’s ethics, we have an obligation to remember past immoral actions. With regard to our own transgressions, I argue that we ought to remember our past transgressions because this is an aspect of our moral development. With regard to others’ transgressions, I argue that we have a duty of self-respect to demand that others respect us (in the Kantian sense, that is, that others treat us in a morally correct way) and that this involves remembering others’ transgressions, particularly when there is no evidence of their repentance or if they have not apologized. However, if we have (fallible) reasons to think that the wrongdoer has repented, then there is certainly no need to continue to remind them of their offenses. Thus, in the first two sections, my arguments are based on a certain interpretation of Kant’s ethical texts. However, when I address the political dimension of the ethics of memory I have based my arguments on the work of contemporary authors, especially Jeffrey Blustein. In the last section then, the perspective is more ‘Kantian’ than Kant’s. I argue that we have a duty to remember the victims of social and political injustice (social and political violence, oppression, discrimination, atrocity and crimes against humanity). Defenders of the importance of political memory usually appeal to consequentialist arguments. However, these arguments have limits. A Kantian perspective (deontological) is relevant here because it allows us to provide new arguments in support of the importance of political memory and thus ultimately to provide a stronger defense of duties of memory. -/- The issues that arise in relation to an ethics of memory will no doubt require that we study other sources in addition to the materials and arguments provided from a Kantian perspective. Nevertheless, I conclude that perhaps a bit surprisingly, the Kantian tradition has more to offer than it initially seemed, and it can certainly provide part of the theoretical framework to develop an ethics of memory. (shrink)

In this article I will offer a reconsideration of Soran Reader’s moral pacifism. I will begin by reconstructing the three main arguments presented by Reader in her article ‘Making Pacifism Plausible’ in the second part of this essay. In the third section, I discuss and evaluate Reader’s arguments and conclude that her moral pacifism is indeed plausible. In the fourth section, I introduce the notion of political pacifism. Moral pacifism is the philosophical thesis that war cannot be morally justified. Political (...) pacifism, in contrast, refers to the political movement that aims to abolish the institution of war to replace it with an institution of peace. My proposal is that we combine moral pacifism and political pacifism in order to show that in today’s world we are faced with a situation of structural injustice with regard to international conflicts between states. In the status quo, international war is the accepted institution to solve conflicts between states. However, according to moral pacifism, war is always morally problematic. I argue that our current political situation is structurally unfair and when we are threatened with an unjust external invasion, we have no morally sound choices for action. Going to war and refusing to fight are both deeply morally problematic options. Without just alternatives, we may end up going to war to protect our territory and children. However, we should resist the temptation to conclude that war can be just, even in these circumstances. In the last section of the article, I conclude that philosophers should stop using all their intellectual energy to provide philosophical justifications for a just war theory (a theory that is widely accepted by contemporary philosophers). Instead, we ought to argue that war is always unjust, and precisely for this reason we should commit to research about how to replace the institution of war with an institution of peace, and think about what would be the most appropriate form for such institution. For these reasons, I believe it is important for us to reconsider Soran Reader’s moral pacifism. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to point up an essential attitude, an anxiety even, that has inflected – and perhaps inhibited - our engagement with film. Film theory has been marked by a ‘refusal to see, a looking away’ (Mulvey & Wollen 1976, 36), and my suggestion is that this has achieved its fullest expression in those strands of film theory heavily influenced by psychoanalysis. These, in turn, have remained within a gendered conceptual framework whereby the discursive or (...) the narrative is associated with the masculine, and the image or spectacle is aligned with the feminine. This is not to reject these applications out of hand but rather to revisit this area with its blind spots in mind and to consider aspects that are perhaps at once obvious but often overlooked. (shrink)

In this book chapter, Moya argues that recognizing, indeed mobilizing, identities in the classroom is a necessary part of educating for a just and democratic society. Only a truly multi-perspectival, multicultural education can create the conditions needed to alter the negative identity contingencies that minority students commonly face, while creating opportunities for all students. By treating identities as epistemic resources and mobilizing them, we can draw out their knowledge-generating potential and allow them to contribute positively to the production and transmission (...) of knowledge. (shrink)

The papers collected in this volume are a selection of papers that were presented - or scheduled to be presented - at a workshop entitled Forgiveness and Conflict, which took place from 8-10 September 2014, as part of the Mancept Workshops in Political Theory at the University of Manchester. Some of these contributions are now compiled in this volume. The selected papers draw from different philosophical traditions and conceptual frameworks, addressing many aspects of contemporary philosophical debates on the nature and (...) normativity of forgiveness, including its political aspects. The result is a rich collection of essays which covers a wide variety of philosophical issues, displaying cutting edge scholarship in this area. This introduction provides a brief overview of some of the central themes discussed in the volume with a particular emphasis on their innovative aspects. (shrink)

Self-conflict is a feature of most women’s lives, particularly as we struggle to balance the demands of work and family. Theories of autonomy that rest on a notion of a coherent self treat self-conflict as incompatible with autonomy; therefore, women who suffer self-conflict fail to act autonomously. Though autonomy and self-conflict can be accommodated by conceiving of autonomy as a matter of degree relative to a context of choice, this result sanctions a political system that forces the prioritization of one (...) context over another. Yet choices in one context often compromise choices in another context, creating a situation where acting autonomously simultaneously diminishes autonomy. Given that autonomous choice justifies political liberalism, it is unjust that choices are set against one another in this way. Consequently, the burden on liberal governments to address the structural sources of self-conflict is far greater than is often supposed. (shrink)

Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for (...) deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons. (shrink)

This article intends to analyze the performance and the efficiency of companies and to identify the key factors that may explain it. It was selected a sample with 15 enterprises: 7 Portuguese and 8 Ukrainian ones, belonging to several industries. Financial and non-financial data was collected for 6 years, during the period of 2009 to 2014. Research questions that guided this work were: Are the enterprises efficient/profitable? What factors influence enterprises’ efficiency/performance? Is there any difference between Ukrainian and Portuguese enterprises’ (...) efficiency/performance, which factors have more influence? Which industrial sector is represented by more efficient/profitable enterprises? The main results showed that in average enterprises were efficient with low level of profitability. According to gained results several indicators were highlighted so that companies would pay more attention to them. (shrink)

This Note examines whether, and at which stages, a criminal defendant should be permitted to offer genetic evidence of a predisposition to psychopathy. Drawing on multidisciplinary sources, including the work of legal scholars, neurobiologists, psychologists, and medical researchers, the Note discusses psychopathy, its symptoms, and how it is measured, along with the proposed genetic and environmental causes of the disorder. The Note then examines current evidence rules and trends in the admissibility of genetic evidence at the guilt/innocence phase of criminal (...) trials and at sentencing. After discussing the potential effects of admitting evidence of a genetic basis for psychopathy at both of these phases, the Note concludes that the stigmatizing nature of the disorder and the uncertainty over its causes make it inadvisable to admit this type of evidence at the guilt/innocence phase of trial. However, admitting this evidence at sentencing is not objectionable. (shrink)

Hay doble pulsión en el centro de la discusión del razonamiento deductivo. Una conduce aparentemente a la abstracción y dominios arbitrarios, mientras que la otra conduce a la concreción y la dependencia del contenido. El objetivo de esta investigación es diseñar, aplicar y validar un instrumento de evaluación que nos permita corroborar si el razonamiento deductivo maneja reglas lógicas o contenidos. La muestra de estudio se compuso de 80 participantes (edad 18-77 años). El test consta de 60 ítems categorizados en: (...) formalidad, integrabilidad, complejidad y modalidad. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto la fiabilidad del test de razonamiento deductivo con un alpha de Cronbach. 775 y con un índice de validación. 850 para el índice de inteligencia no verbal (INV) del RIAS. Cómo conclusión inferimos que el razonador deductivo no dispone de un cuerpo preciso de reglas generales deductivas, sino que usa colecciones de reglas heurísticas cada vez menos abstractas. (shrink)

Vast archives of fragmentary structural brain scans that are routinely acquired in medical clinics for diagnostic purposes have so far been considered to be unusable for neuroscientific research. Yet, recent studies have proposed that by deploying machine learning algorithms to fill in the missing anatomy, clinical scans could, in future, be used by researchers to gain new insights into various brain disorders. This chapter focuses on a study published in2019, whose authors developed a novel unsupervised machine learning algorithm for synthesising (...) missing anatomy in extremely sparse clinical MRI scans of thousands of stroke patients. By approaching the study from a media-theoretical perspective, I analyse how its authors dis-cursively negotiated the anatomical and operative plausibility of the unobserved anatomy that their black-boxed algorithm reconstructed from the existing sparse data. My analysis fore-grounds the processual, relational, context-dependent, and essentially unstable character of the thus established plausibility of the algorithmically synthesised neuroanatomy. (shrink)

After the Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration released in April 2019 the first empirical images of a black hole, an astrophysical object previously thought “unseeable,” much of the public discourse has approached these images as straightforward visual depictions of a black hole. This article challenges this view by showing that the first images of a black hole went beyond merely making an invisible cosmic object visible and that the images published in April 2019 were just the first in a series of (...) black hole images the researchers continue producing. Drawing primarily on Sybille Krämer’s concept of the cartographic impulse, the article demonstrates that the Event Horizon Telescope images are, first and foremost, epistemic tools. These epistemic tools enable researchers to actively explore various physical aspects and dynamic properties of a black hole’s immediate environment and test theoretical predictions about it, thus making this elusive environment empirically knowable. To demonstrate this, the article analyses the mapping operations that combined automated algorithmic procedures with expert human judgment and through which these images were produced, read, and interpreted. It also examines how the different Event Horizon Telescope images relate to one another, which particular epistemic functions they fulfil in the research context, under which conditions, and with which limitations, thus tracing how these images facilitate the production of new scientific knowledge about black holes. (shrink)

The story of Abraham – and the divine command to sacrifice his son Isaac – is, as many of us know, the source of inspiration for some reflections of Kierkegaard in his work Fear and Trembling. From this episode, Johannes de Silentio, the pseudony- mous author of the work, who makes an ode to faith as the highest of the passions, also wonders about a problem that, according to his interpretation, seems central, i.e. the teleological suspension of morality. The objective (...) of this paper is to investigate, especially from the reflections of Kierkegaard, a possible interpretation for the teleological suspension of morality and in what circumstances such a thing does occur and where we can insert it in the ethical debates of philosophy of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Kant is probably one of the most misunderstood philosophers in the history of Western thought. Some of the most well-known and pervasive objections to Kant’s practical philosophy often rest on considerable misunderstandings of his central theses or a poor and superficial reading of his work. A common misconception is that in Kant’s practical philosophy there is no place or role for human happiness. In Happiness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: Morality, Indirect Duties, and Welfare Rights, Alice Pinheiro Walla dispels this misunderstanding (...) by elucidating Kant’s conception of happiness (understood in broadly hedonist terms) and showing that, for Kant, the pursuit of happiness plays an important role in our personal and collective lives. This means that, far from endorsing an ascetic ideal of the moral agent, as it is commonly thought, Kant’s system embraces an ideal of the human life in which there is significant space, and even a duty, to pursue pleasurable endeavours. Somehow surprisingly, in Pinheiro Walla’s reading, Kant’s ethics is arguably less demanding than standard interpretations of Aristotelian and Utilitarian ethical theories. (shrink)

There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of (...) descriptive properties. These similarities give us reason to investigate the idea that, like moral thought and talk, gender thought and talk is inherently normative. This paper proposes a normative account of gender thought and talk in terms of fitting treatment. On this fitting treatment account, to judge that A is gender G is just to judge that it is fitting to treat A as a G. This account is a descriptive or hermeneutical account of our gender thought and talk rather than an ameliorative account of our gender concepts or a metaphysical account of gender properties in social metaphysics. This paper argues that other descriptive accounts of gender thought and talk face problems that the fitting treatment account overcomes. (shrink)

As ciências médicas, biomédicas, humanas e sociais têm avançado de forma frenética nos últimos anos. Com isso, se faz cada vez mais necessário o debate ético que visa contemplar o respeito à dignidade humana, animal e ao meio ambiente. A bioética se dedica a esse debate e se propõe a estendê-lo a setores não acadêmicos, como sociedades de proteção dos animais, dos direitos humanos e até grupos religiosos. Essa diversidade de opiniões não só é interessante, mas necessária, uma vez que (...) os valores praticados em uma sociedade provêm de uma construção social cujos blocos fundamentais têm origem na família e nos diversos grupos sociais nos quais os indivíduos estão inseridos desde o seu nascimento. A proposta deste livro é fomentar esse debate, fornecendo conceitos e visões sobre temas selecionados da pesquisa e da prática médica, biotecnológica e de áreas correlatas. Em um contexto mundial de intolerância política, social, étnica e de gênero, oportunidades de debate também possuem um papel social de auxiliar no desenvolvimento consciente da cidadania e do respeito ao próximo. Sobretudo, o debate nos faz enxergar o outro como parelho, ainda que cada um possua as suas especificidades, opiniões e histórias de vida. (shrink)

This article interrogates how both visual culture and queer futurity can be made visible in and through the Philippine archive as a case in point. It begins by problematizing a paradoxical specter of futurity that seems to haunt more the Global North. But despite such haunting, the Philippines in the Global South continues to have thin to nil (i.e., nearly absent) envisioning toward a queer futurity, for most Filipino LGBTQIA + scholars seem to still be engaged in recovering “lost histories” (...) from the archives and “thick descriptions” of the present, while focusing more on the textual than the visual. The article then proceeds to discuss mobilizing ekphrasis and representation as main conceptual tools in bridging the temporally opposite projects of queer archiving and queer futurity. It analyzes through ekphrastic re-reading the various LGBTQIA + representations from the Philippine archive – that is, a “palimpsestic site” of colonial confrontations, national (re)construction, and potentially global queer critique. These re-readings along the archival grain juxtapose the archival representations as historically authentic vis-à-vis their more present-day representations as visual proxies. Yet more crucially, the potency of these ekphrastic re-readings – in lieu of visually actual – lies in their capacity to reverberate queer possibilities, re-awakening them from their sleep within the archives, and thus re-mobilizing them toward becoming a useful part of academics, activists, and artists’ “shared arsenal” in re-envisioning and, hopefully in time, reifying such past possibilities into future queer actualities anew. (shrink)

Contrary to the widely held belief in the humanities that hysteria no longer exists, this article shows that the advent of new brain imaging technologies has reignited scientific research into this age-old disorder, once again linking it to hypnosis. Even though humanities scholarship to date has paid no attention to it, image-based research of hysteria via hypnosis has been hailed in specialist circles for holding the potential to finally unravel the mystery of this elusive disorder. Following a succinct overview of (...) how hypnosis was used in the nineteenth century hysteria research, the article details how the relationship between hysteria and hypnosis is currently renegotiated in the context of brain imaging studies. It shows that the current research has so far failed to deliver on its promise of uncovering the link between hysteria and hypnosis. It further argues that despite huge technological advances in imaging technologies, contemporary researchers grapple with conceptual problems comparable to those that plagued their nineteenth century predecessors. (shrink)

Hysteria, a mysterious disease known since antiquity, is said to have ceased to exist. Challenging this commonly held view, this is the first cross-disciplinary study to examine the current functional neuroimaging research into hysteria and compare it to the nineteenth-century image-based research into the same disorder. Paula Muhr's central argument is that, both in the nineteenth-century and the current neurobiological research on hysteria, images have enabled researchers to generate new medical insights. Through detailed case studies, Muhr traces how different (...) images, from photography to functional brain scans, have reshaped the historically situated medical understanding of this disorder that defies the mind-body dualism. (shrink)

This paper considers the obligation higher income countries have to lower and middle income countries during a global pandemic. Further considers which reforms are needed to the global supply-chain of medical resources. The short-comings in distribution and medical infrastructure have exacerbated the health crisis in developing countries. Global justice demands radical redistribution of medical resources in order to prevent mass casualties. This is argued first by highlighting that the COVID-19 pandemic should be acknowledged as an issue of global justice, secondly, (...) higher income countries ought to account for distribution inequity as a matter of rectifying past injustices, and thirdly argue for reform in distribution while considering the vaccine rollout as a prime example. We aim to show how the differences from country to country in response capabilities are a result of the economic foundation colonialism established and a direct result of cyclical poverty, which wealthy countries perpetuate to this day. (shrink)

Библиогр.: с. 190-206.В настоящей книге мы стремились обрисовать контуры нормативной модели смены фундаментальных научных теорий продемонстрировать эффективность ее применения на примере перехода «Лоренц – Эйнштейн». Нелишне еще раз подчеркнуть, что ни сама модель, ни задаваемые ей теоретические реконструкции ни в коей мере не являются окончательными. Единственное, на что претендует автор, – это лишь на то, что они лучше – в определенных аспектах – предложенных к настоящему времени моделей и реконструкций. Поэтому не только нельзя констатировать, что все проблемы – методологического и (...) историко-научного характера (даже сформулированные в начале данного исследования) – полностью и окончательно решены. Напротив, предлагаемая концепция ставит (а иногда по-новому формулирует) ряд сложных и интеречных задач. Перечислим вкратце некоторые из них. Во-первых, желательно выяснить, насколько данная концепция является универсальной, уточнить область ее применимости. Может ли она претендовать на реконструкцию всех процессов смены в истории физики, и если не может, то каких именно? Ответ на последний вопрос представляет для модели исключительный интерес, поскольку он может указать на возможные направления ее дальнейшего совершенствования. Скажем, способна ли наша концепция дать достаточно адекватные описания переходов «Птолемей – Коперник» или «Аристотель – Галилей – Ньютон»? Далее, применима ли наша модель к развитию других естественных наук, скажем, к историям химии и биологии? Может ли она описать переходы «Пристли – Лавуазье» или «Ламарк – Дарвин»? Во-вторых, как «работает» модель в современной физике? Способна ли она указать определенные направления крайне актуального сейчас синтеза общей теории относительности и квантовой теории поля? Некоторые попытки (см., например, Нугаев, 1987) обнадеживают, но до реальных результатов еще далеко. В-третьих, реконструкция научной революциив физике в начале XX века также ставит не меньше проблем чем решает. Несмотря на то, она ориентирует исследователей на единое, целостное рассмотрение двух рассматривавшихся, как правило, изолированно, научных революций – квантовой и релятивистской – встает вопрос о более детальном рассмотрении взаимодействия «эйнштейновской» и «боровской» программ. Дальнейшее продвижение в этом направлении предполагает рассмотрение, возможно, под новым углом зрения, истории становления квантовой механики начиная с 20-х годов. И, наконец, последней (отнюдь не по важности) является проблема взаимодействия когнитивных и социальных факторов в процессе смены фундаментальных теорий. Иногда отказ от стандартной гипотетико-дедуктивной интерпретации естественнонауч-ной теории (см. подробнее введение) воспринимается как свидетельство в пользу так называемой «сильной программы» социологии науки, сформулированной Д. Блуром, с. Барнсом и др. (см., например, обзор «Современная западная социология науки», 1988). С точки зрения сторонников этой программы, движущие силы развития научного познания определяются не внутренними факторами развития науки, а ее социокультурным окружением. Именно последнее оказывает решающее влияние на смену фундаментальных теорий. Например, согласно работе американского историка науки П. Формана «Веймарская культура, причинность и квантовая теория», причиной перехода от классической механики к квантовой было распространение среди немецких физиков экзистенциалистской « философии жизни», характеризующейся антагонизмом к рациональности. Одним из каналов, через который индетерминистские настроения «проникали» в среду немецких ученых, была философия Шпенглера (см. подробнее Мамчур, 1987). Как справедливо (там же) отмечает Е. А. Мамчур, необходимо проводить различие между социальной природой познания, его социокультурной обусловленностью и социокультурной детермина-цией. Концепция социальной природы познания – важнейший принцип гносеологии: подлинным субъктом познания является все человеческое общество. Согласно тезису о социокультурной обусловленности познания, разделяемому подавляющим большинством исследователей (см., например, Бляхер и Волынская, 1976; Казютинский, 1979; Карпинская, 1980; Кузнецова, 1984; Пахомов, 1985 и др.), социокультурные факторы через философию, картину мира, идеалы научного познания оказывают определенное влияние на процесс научного познания. Но тезис о социокультурной детерминации требует, чтобы социокультурные факторы определяли саму внутреннюю логику развития науки и, как таковой, вызывает определенные трудности в интерпретации различных периодов развития науки (подробнее см. Мамчур, 1987). (shrink)

The potential for Large Language Models (LLMs) to attain technological singularity—the point at which artificial intelligence (AI) surpasses human intellect and autonomously improves itself—is a critical concern in AI research. This paper explores the feasibility of current LLMs achieving singularity by examining the philosophical and practical requirements for such a development. We begin with a historical overview of AI and intelligence amplification, tracing the evolution of LLMs from their origins to state-of-the-art models. We then proposes a theoretical framework to assess (...) whether existing LLM technologies could satisfy the conditions for singularity, with a focus on Recursive Self-Improvement (RSI) and autonomous code generation. We integrate key component technologies, such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), into our analysis, illustrating how these could enable LLMs to independently enhance their reasoning and problem-solving capabilities. By mapping out a potential singularity model lifecycle and examining the dynamics of exponential growth models, we elucidate the conditions under which LLMs might self-replicate and rapidly escalate their intelligence. We conclude with a discussion of the ethical and safety implications of such developments, underscoring the need for responsible and controlled advancement in AI research to mitigate existential risks. Our work aims to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on the future of AI and the critical importance of proactive measures to ensure its beneficial development. (shrink)

Book review of Maria Lugones's Pilgramages/peregrinajes: Theorizing coalition against multiple oppressions (Rowman & Littlefield 2003).

Graduates' employability indicates the excellent education and relevant preparation they obtained from their respective degrees. Tracer studies have enabled higher education institutions to profile their graduates while also reflecting on the quality of education they provide. With the foregoing, a tracer study determined the demographic and academic profile of teacher education graduates from 2017 to 2020 in a state university in the West Philippines. It also ascertained the advanced studies they attended after college, their employment data, the relevance of college (...) preparation with their current employment, difficulties they encountered while securing employment and in their present job, and recommendations to strengthen the teacher education program. The study utilized a descriptive survey research design with 80 non-random samples chosen based on availability. The survey was based on the Philippine Commission on Higher Education with modifications elucidated from previous studies. Results showed that graduates took the teacher education program with a strong passion for the teaching profession. More graduates received honors and awards, passed the licensure examinations for teachers, attended advanced studies for professional development, and are employable. Besides, the graduates’ college preparation is relevant to their current employment. Further, difficulties and problems encountered and recommendations to strengthen the teacher education program were noted. These findings may serve as a baseline for curriculum review and give suggestions for future tracer studies. (shrink)

The problem addressed in this article is the relationship between law and morality. It is asked (1) to what extent law and morality are connected and separated and (2) since when has it been so. To the extent that law and morality are distinct normative orders, it is asked (3) whether they rule exactly the same behaviors or whether each order rules dierent kinds of behaviors. If they rule at least some of the same behaviors, it is asked (4) whether (...) there can be antinomies (contradictions) between them. If there are an- tinomies, it is asked (5) whether the antinomies are only apparent (prima facie) and are therefore mistakes of human reason, or are definite and real. If the antinomies are apparent or real, it is asked (6) whether law or morality prevails (or should prevail) in the case of an antinomy. If one of these prevails, it is asked (7) whether this is always so, or whether law sometimes prevails (and should prevail) over morality and vice versa. In the case of existing coherence or at least solvable antinomies between law and morality, it is asked (8) whether the consequent achieved unity of practical reason is a specifically moral unity and whether it is a matter of cognition, of institutionalization, of individual or collective construction, or of consensus. (shrink)

A survey of color science and color vision.

The Common Anatomy Reference Ontology (CARO) is being developed to facilitate interoperability between existing anatomy ontologies for different species, and will provide a template for building new anatomy ontologies. CARO has a structural axis of classification based on the top-level nodes of the Foundational Model of Anatomy. CARO will complement the developmental process sub-ontology of the GO Biological Process ontology, using it to ensure the coherent treatment of developmental stages, and to provide a common framework for the model organism communities (...) to classify developmental structures. Definitions for the types and relationships are being generated by a consortium of investigators from diverse backgrounds to ensure applicability to all organisms. CARO will support the coordination of cross-species ontologies at all levels of anatomical granularity by cross-referencing types within the cell type ontology (CL) and the Gene Ontology (GO) Cellular Component ontology. A complete cross-species CARO could be utilized in other ontologies for cross-product generation. (shrink)

For years now, unionization has been under vigorous attack. Membership has been steadily declining, and with it union bargaining power. As a result, unions may soon lose their ability to protect workers from economic and personal abuse, as well as their significance as a political force. In the Name of Liberty responds to this worrying state of affairs by presenting a new argument for unionization, one that derives an argument for universal unionization in both the private and public sector from (...) concepts of liberty that we already accept. In short, In the Name of Liberty reclaims the argument for liberty from the political right, and shows how liberty not only requires the unionization of every workplace as a matter of background justice, but also supports a wide variety of other progressive policies. (shrink)

La presente investigación de corte filológico fue un intento de aproximación un tanto inédito a determinados datos de composición de una de las tradiciones literarias, también, hebrea de larga fecha (alrededor de 2000 años, periodo herodiano, considerando su testimonio documental semita más antiguo hasta el momento: 11Q11 y 4Q84) comúnmente denominada el salmo 91. Para ello, se hizo uso de la crítica textual, la intertextualidad y la exegesis con el fin de averiguar, en base rasgos sintácticos, gramaticales, uso de vocabulario (...) y retórica, haber alguna clase de correspondencia entre la tradición aquí en cuestión y su entorno literario, correspondencia que, como una huella digital en una escena del crimen, pudiera indicar la existencia de una paternidad literaria compartida entre el salmo y otra composición (o, composiciones), mas, si es mucho decir misma autoría, entonces, alguna clase de dependencia, relación de derivación entre composiciones. Como se podrá observar, la aplicación metodológica no sé realizó sobre la totalidad del salmo sino sobre una pequeña porción selecta del texto. Así mismo, otro objetivo que se buscó alcanzar fue lograr una comprensión teológica (en el sentido de qué ideas sostenía el autor, a nivel discursivo, literario, no como una verdad a que vivir) acertada del fragmento elegido. Se cree que los resultados son relevantes e inéditos. . . . . (Observación: el compromiso personal del tesista respecto al objeto de la investigación se limite, meramente, a un abordaje literario profesional, no hay ninguna clase de compromiso de vida respecto a la tradición aquí en cuestión [en el sentido de una creencia metafísica de la que vive; el investigador es ateo agnóstico]. Las conclusiones de la tesis [más que nada, aquellas referentes al significado teológico del trozo estudiado] están para exponer las ideas del autor vinculado al manuscrito bajo análisis, y no como recomendaciones para la vida, no es una obra proselitista. En otras palabras, se buscó entender lo que el autor realmente quiso expresar con lo que puso por escrito, aunque las ideas del texto no viniesen a ser las mismas que las del tesista. Desde la utilidad, la ética, lo científico… el investigador no encuentra razones como para recomendar una aplicación a nivel personal de las conclusiones expuestas en la presente tesis. No obstante, sí, las conclusiones tienen mucha relevancia, en la opinión del investigador, a nivel del estudio de la lengua hebrea y griega, para la historiografía, la historia, la reflexión sociológica, filosófica, antropológica, el estudio del desarrollo de la literatura hebrea y griega, así como para _ y sobre todo _ la comprensión de los distintos aspectos relacionados a la tradición aquí en cuestión. Y, finalizando, que no se interprete las aclaraciones previas como un discurso de intolerancia religiosa, el tesista es un defender de las libertades individuales y consensuadas. Lo que se expresó son observaciones de un autor respecto a su producción.) . . . . El presente documento es mi tesis de la Licenciatura en Teología (alumno 18427) cursada en la Facultad de Teología en la UAP (Entre Ríos-Argentina) presentada en la fecha del 10/9/20 y, posteriormente, aprobada en la fecha del 9/11/20 por mi director Dr. Raúl Alberto Quiroga. De paso, estaré publicando aquí en mi perfil de PhilPaper algunas críticas y observaciones a mi tesis y material inédito relacionado a la temática en cuestión, material que fui acumulando a lo largo de los dos años mientras hacia la investigación y que no pude agregar al cuerpo del documento por cuestiones de delimitación y extensión. (shrink)

The Upanishads reveal that in the beginning, nothing existed: “This was but non-existence in the beginning. That became existence. That became ready to be manifest”. (Chandogya Upanishad 3.15.1) The creation began from this state of non-existence or nonduality, a state comparable to (0). One can add any number of zeros to (0), but there will be nothing except a big (0) because (0) is a neutral number. If we take (0) as Nirguna Brahman (God without any form and attributes), then (...) from where and how did the universe come into existence? -/- The neutral power (0) cannot produce anything without having an element of duality in it. Although Nirguna Brahman is neutral, it has a positive, negative, and neutral pole, constituting its Prakriti or nature. Prakriti has three latent Gunas (modes or qualities): Satva, Rajas, and Tamas. They are related to Gyana Shakti (the power of knowledge) Sankalpa Shakti (the power of ideation), and Kriya Shakti (the power of action). Science says that Atom is the basic element from which the universe evolved. The Atom has three nuclei- electron, pluton, and neutron. The Satva, Rajas, and Tamas in Indian spirituality are nothing but the mystical names for the nuclei of an atom. -/- According to Bhagavata Purana, Prakriti is also constituted of the elements of Time, Karma (action/destiny) and Swabhava (innate nature). Time disturbs the equilibrium of Gunas. From the aspect of Karma is produced an entity called Mahat, in the form of intelligence. Mahat is dominated by Satva and Rajas. From Mahat manifests the next evolute dominated by Tamas with three predominant qualities – Dravya (substance), Kriya (action), as well as intelligence. It forms to become the Ego principle (Ahamkara). -/- Ahamkara has three modes – Satvic, Rajasic and Tamasic. Satvic is Jnana oriented, Rajasic action-oriented and Tamasic Dravya (substance) oriented. From the Tamasic Ahankara, five gross elements are produced (ether, air, fire, water, and earth - Akash, Vayu, Agni, Jal and Prithvi). From the Satvic Ahamkara, guardian deities (the sun and moon, deities of sense organs, and organs of action) and from Rajasic Ahamkara, ten senses (Indriyas), five senses of perception, five organs of action, the faculties of intellect and Prana (life breath) are produced. -/- Bhagavata says that since these energies, elements, and faculties remained disassociated, they were combined to form a Cosmic Egg. The egg floats in the primal waters for a thousand years. Then God enters this Cosmic Egg and manifests himself as the Cosmic Purusha. He is the first nucleus, the God particle equivalent to the number (1) which is the embodiment of everything in the universe. The concept of creation and dissolution in Hinduism can be compared to the waves in an ocean that appear and disappear incessantly. The Manvantaras are such successive episodes of creation emerging from the Cosmic Person, the Manu who is embodied God-Consciousness, God himself. These episodes of creation are measured in Hinduism in terms of Manvantaras, the epochs of Manus. -/- Manu is the ‘First-Born’ (1) of God, the Cosmic Purusha from whom the world has originated. This Cosmic Person (Purusha) has been described as having fourteen biospheres (heavens) that are inhabited by various life forms in the order of evolution of consciousness. If we begin from the human biosphere (Bhuloka), there are ten astral biospheres that a man must transcend to attain liberation or Mukti from the cycle of births and deaths. -/- The number (1) produces the primary numbers up to (9) through the transmutation of the creational energies and qualities. The process can be related to the descent and cyclical evolution of (1) through ten spiritual stages, finally merging with the nondual (0). The number (10) marks the merger of (1) with (0). The Hindu worldview is that all life forms in an episode of creation must evolve to become one with the non-dual state (0) to attain liberation from the cycle of births and deaths in a cyclical process. -/- . (shrink)

A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified moral belief in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not undermine justified non-moral belief. Call this argument the argument for moral skepticism from peer disagreement. Jason Decker and Daniel Groll have recently made a companions in guilt response to this argument. Decker and Groll argue that if peer disagreement undermines justified moral belief, then peer disagreement undermines much non-moral justified belief; if the argument for (...) moral skepticism from peer disagreement succeeds, then a kind of non-moral skepticism holds too. And we should not hold that the status of such non-moral beliefs are undermined by peer disagreement. In this paper, I shows that Decker and Groll’s companions in guilt argument fails. I then draw out the implications of my argument for the epistemology of disagreement and the epistemology of moral disagreement more generally. For instance, I then argue that peer disagreement about morality does not undermine all justified moral belief but that peer disagreement about morality does preclude most moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not preclude most non-moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge. (shrink)